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Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 1991).

Morton International, Inc. v.

Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991).

Both of the identified issues involve questions of

law which must be reviewed in accordance with the "correction of
error" standard.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

determinative statute in this case.

35-1-67

(1975)

is

the

It is set forth in full in the

Addendum hereto as Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Hansen seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order
granting Respondent Salt Lake City's Motion for Review reversing
the prior award of the Administrative Law Judge wherein he alleged
entitlement to permanent, total disability compensation occasioned
by his 1976 work-ending industrial accident.
Course of Proceedings
Mr.

Hansen

filed

an

application

for

permanent,

total

disability benefits occasioned by an industrial accident which
occurred on May 21, 1976.
failed to prove

Respondents alleged that Mr. Hansen

legal and medical causation and was thus not

entitled to permanent, total disability benefits (R. at 36-38).

A

formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge was held on April
14, 1992 (R. at 46).
Disposition Below
On March 18, 1993 the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr.
Hansen had demonstrated legal and medical causation and that his
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symptoms and total disability status were the result of his 1976
industrial injury (R. at 173). A Medical Panel was appointed to
examine Mr. Hansen and to review his medical records.

The Panel

made certain determinations as to the Applicant's impairments and
when they arose (R. at 110-126) .

No objections to the Medical

Panel report were filed by any party, and it was not contradicted
by any other medical evidence contained in the file (R. at 188) .
His claim for permanent, total disability benefits was granted in
a thorough, 26-page Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated
March 18, 1993. A copy of the Order is attached to the Addendum as
Exhibit B.
Respondent Salt Lake City

filed a Motion for Review with the

Industrial Commission on April 29, 1993 (R. at 201-219).

On May

13, 1994 the Industrial Commission entered an "Order Denying Motion
for Review" although the substance of the Order, in fact, granted
the Motion for Review.

In doing so the Industrial Commission

adopted all of the Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law
Judge, but reversed the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of
Law and Order, denying Mr. Hansen's claim of entitlement to
permanent, total disability benefits (R. at 260-263). A copy of
that Order is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit C.

Mr Hansen

challenges that final agency action in this Petition for Review.
Statement of the Facts
This case involves a claim for permanent, total disability
benefits related to a May 21, 1976 industrial accident wherein Mr.
Hansen sustain*

injuries to his left knee and right foot. He was

employed by Respondent Salt Lake City Corporation on the date of
his injury and worked as a maintenance man and glazier at the Salt

3

Lake City Airport.

Part of his responsibilities

installation of glass.

involved the

On May 21, 1976 Mr. Hansen was unloading a

crate of glass when the crate tipped over and the glass fell on him
injuring his lower extremities (R. at 34).
Mr. Hansen subsequently had surgery performed on his right
ankle on May 21, 1976 and later had left knee surgery on September
8, 1976 which were both related to his industrial accident (R. at
173).

When he attempted to return to work in mid-January 1977, he

had some difficulty doing so, and approximately three weeks later,
on February 4, 1977, while at work carrying a bundle of chain link
fencing, his left knee and right foot gave way causing him to fall
to the ground.

He was unable to return to work thereafter (R. at

174).
Mr.

Hansen

testified

that

Salt

Lake

City

terminated

him

because he was unable to perform the duties that were required of
him at the Salt Lake Airport (R. at 174).

Salt Lake City argued

that they had sent him a letter directing him to the personnel
office to see if other suitable work was available; however, that
letter was sent to an incorrect address and there was no evidence
either that he received that letter or that Salt Lake City offered
Mr. Hansen any opportunity for re-employment or retraining (R. at
174).
On May 24, 1977 Dr. Edward Hayes, the orthopedic surgeon who
performed Mr. Hansen's surgery, wrote a letter to Salt Lake City
Corporation indicating that Mr. Hansen could possibly return to
light duty work as of April 25, 1977 (R. at 588); however, no light
duty work was available or offered to him at the airport by Salt
Lake City ( R. at 174) . Mr. Hansen testified that he was unable to
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perform the work he had done all of his life because of his left
knee and right ankle injuries (R. at 174). His testimony was not
challenged by any opposing nr contradictory evidence.
On June 13, 1977 Mr. Hansen applied for Social Security total
disability benefits (R. at 869-872) and on June 17, 1977 he also
filed an Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission
seeking permanent, partial disability compensation (R. at 1) . From
June 1977 through May 1978, Mr. Hansen was involved in processing
his claims for Social Security disability benefits and additional
workers compensation disability benefits.
A hearing on his workers compensation claim was held on
September 19, 1977 and on May 10, 1978, Mr, Hansen received a
permanent, partial disability award based upon a 16% whole person
rating by a Medical Panel (R. at 16) .
Social Security initially denied Mr. Hansen's June 13, 1977
application for total disability benefits finding that he was
capable of doing light work; however, on October 31, 1977, he filed
a Request for Reconsideration indicating that his movements were so
restricted that he could not work (R. at 1021).
1977, tin

On December 13,

Social Security Administration confirmed its earlier

denial, and on January 27, 1978, Mr. Hansen filed a Request for
Hearing which on May 31, 1978 resulted in his being awarded total
disability benefits based primarily on the right ankle, with his
left knee mentioned as an additional problem. The Social Security
Administrative Law Judge relied a great deal on the testimony of a
vocational expei I who found that Mr. Hansen did not have the
residual

functional

employment.

Total

capacity

to perform

disability

substantial, gainful

benefits were

5

awarded

to him

retroactively to May 21, 1976, the date of his industrial accident
(R. at 847-852).
On

January

11,

1983

Mr.

Hansen's

Social

Security

total

disability benefits were temporarily discontinued on the basis that
it was asserted that he was now capable of gainful activity.
March

7, 1983, he filed a Request

for Reconsideration

On

and on

October 26, 1983 his benefits were reinstated and back-dated for a
continuous award from the May 21, 1976 industrial injury date (R.
at 847-852).
Salt Lake City last paid workers compensation weekly benefits
to Mr. Hansen in January 1983, although they have continued to pay
for his medical treatment, including his prescriptions since then
up to and including the present (R. at 84).
Mr. Hansen filed his claim for permanent, total disability
compensation on November 16, 1990 ( R. at 34) . Respondents did not
present any evidence at the hearing with respect to Mr. Hansen's
ability to work.

He is now a 66-year old man with a ninth grade

education who has no transferable skills and who has not worked
since

1977, a period

referral

for

a

of almost

determination

18 years.
regarding

Respondents waived
his

vocational

rehabilitation potential (R. at 149), essentially stipulating to
his unemployability.

The matter was referred to a Medical Panel

which found that Mr. Hansen had a 70% (whole person) permanent,
partial impairment of which 16% was exclusively attributable to the
industrial accident (R. at 110-126, 129-130).
Following subsequent, substantial input by counsel for the
parties, the Administrative Law Judge on March 18, 1993 adopted the
findings of the Medical Panel as her own and concluded that the

6

"preponderance of the evidence shows that Mr. Hansen has been
disabled since the date of his industrial injury, May 21, 1976, to
the

present: , "

She

ordered

the

payment

of

permanent,

total

disability compensation benefits to Mr. Hansen (R. at 170-196).
The Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Review with the
Industrial Commission (R. at 201-220).
On May 13, 1994, the Industrial Commission entered an Order
entitled "Order Denying Motion for Review11 although the substance
of the Order indicated, in fact, that the Motion for Review of Salt
Lake City Corporation had actually been granted.
Industrial

Commission

Administrative

adopted

all

of

Law Judge, but reversed

the

In doing so, the
findings

of

the

the Administrative

Law

Judge's conclusions and denied Mr. Hansen's claim for permanent,
total disability compensation (R. at 260-263).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Industrial

Commission

failed

the

workers

compensation act liberally in favor of awarding benefits.

In fact,

the Industi : i a] Commission engaged

to

apply

in speculation

' • support a

denial of benefits, and without any record support or meaningful
reasoning or explanation for its position.
Mr.

Hansen

doctrine.
Industrial

is

entitled

to

benefits

under

the

"Odd-Lot"

This basis for benefits was not even addressed by the
Commission.

Respondents

conceded

that

Mr.

Hansen

sustained an industrial injury, was not a suitable candidate for
vocational rehabilitation or retraining and that he was and is now
permanently and totally disabled.

The burden then shifted to the

employer to prove the 'existence of regular steady work which the
employers can do taking into account his education, mental capacity
7

and age.'

They have wholly failed to meet that burden.

Finally, the Industrial Commission adopted all of the Findings
of

Fact

of

the

Administrative

Law

Judge,

but

then

entered

Conclusions of Law which have no support in the Findings.
Findings of Fact as

The

entered by the Administrative Law Judge and as

adopted by the Industrial Commission compel the conclusion that Mr.
Hansen

is permanently

and

totally

disabled

by

reason

of

his

industrial injury.
ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS ARE TO BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER,
Few

principles

of workers7

compensation

law

are

as

well

established in this State as that workers7 compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of the claim.

Utah

Courts have consistently

principle from 1919 to the present.
796 P.2d

676

(Utah

1990);

reiterated

this

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,

State Tax Commission v.

Industrial

Commission, supra., J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission,
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v.
Industrial

Commission,

405

P.2d

613

(Utah

1965);

Askrew

v.

Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court
proper

construction

in Chandler, supra, discussed

of the Workers 7
8

Compensation

Act

and

the
the

underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
x
employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other, should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law applied this vital rule of construction.
Her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law evidence a "liberal
construction" and "resolution of doubt in favor of the claim".
Unfortunately, the Industrial Commission on review ignored this

9

basic principal.
Rather, whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the
record, the Industrial Commission construed it against the injured
employee by selectively referencing Mr. Hansen's medical records,
highlighting a subsequent medical condition and virtually ignoring
the

significant

and

work-terminating

injury

to

his

lower

extremities. In fact the Industrial Commission went to the extreme
to construe the record against the claim.
Although extensive proceedings were held before the Social
Security Administration which subsequently made a finding of total
disability, the Industrial Commission dismissed it on the unfounded
assertion that "... the Commission does not know the underlying
facts upon which the Social Security Administration made its award,
whether those facts are supported by the evidence...." (R. at 9). 1
In light of the Industrial Commission's highly selective and
prejudicial construction of the medical evidence, the absence of
any conflicting lay, medical or disability evidence refuting Mr.
Hansen's

claim,

the

denial

of

permanent,

total

disability

compensation, for the reasons set forth in greater detail below, is
simply not supported by the record.
In conclusion, the entire underlying basis of the Order is
fundamentally flawed and is nothing more than a speculative,

1

Interestingly enough, the Industrial Commission acknowledges
that under current law the commission would have been required to
follow the "sequential decision making process of the Social
Security Administration." No reasonable explanation is given why
it did not - as the Administrative Law Judge in this case did follow that same process.
In addition, the complete Social
Security file consisting of 28 exhibits and totalling almost 200
pages was a part of the record below, but the Industrial Commission
Order failed to refer to it at all.
10

unsupported, inartfully drafted, cursory view of the evidence. The
Industrial Commission's Order clearly does not evidence the "humane
and beneficent purposes" required by Utah Workers Compensation law.
The Order should be reversed due to this obvious conceptual flaw.
II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO UPHOLD THE
ORDER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AWARDING WORKERS
COMPENSATION BENEFITS PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED "ODD LOT" DOCTRINE.
Petitioner is also entitled to permanent, total disability
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine.
monumental

treatise

on

workers'

Professor Larson in his

compensation

reviewed

this

doctrine, as follows:
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in
virtually every jurisdiction, total disability may be
found in the case of workers who, while not altogether
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable
dependability with which claimant can sell his services
in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such
factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or the
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his
crippling handicaps. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1989). (footnotes
omitted).
Pursuant to well-established Utah case-law, an injured worker may
be found to be totally disabled if by reason of the disability
resulting from the injury, he cannot perform work of the general
character that he was performing when injured, or any other work
which a person of his capabilities may be able to do or learn to
do. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984).
Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc. , 622, P.2d 790 (1980).

Clark v.

Interstate Homes, Inc., 604 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1979). United Park
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City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1964).
Caillet v. Industrial Commission. 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936). Mr.
Hansen clearly meets this standard for entitlement.
There is no dispute, and Respondents readily concede, that Mr.
Hansen sustained an industrial injury, was and is not a suitable
candidate for vocational rehabilitation or retraining, and was and
is permanently and totally disabled. Their only basis for dispute
is whether Mr. Hansen's 1976 industrial injury was a significant
enough "cause" of his unemployability.
On January 27, 1978 the United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Social Security Administration, determined that Mr.
Hansen was totally disabled as of the date of his industrial injury
and that he was not a viable candidate for rehabilitation.

The

Social Security total disability file confirms that Mr. Hansen's
industrial accident was the precipitating and eventual cause of his
inability to engage in substantial, gainful employment.
As a result of the July

1, 1988 change in the Workers

Compensation Code, the sequential evaluation process which the
federal government utilized in reaching its decision concerning Mr.
Hansen's permanent, total disability status, has been statutorily
adopted as one which the Industrial Commission must similarly
apply.

Although not technically binding in this case, because

Petitioner's industrial accident preceded those changes to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67

(1988), that finding is still

persuasive, legally as well as factually.
In order to fully appreciate the application of the "odd-lot"
doctrine it is helpful to understand its development and the facts
under which it has been found to apply.
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A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE.

Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-lot"
doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 1 KB
1009 (1911):
There are cases in which the burden of showing suitable
work can in fact be obtained does fall up the employer.
... [If]... the capacities for work left to him fit him
only for special uses and do not ... make his powers of
labor a merchantable article in some well known lines of
the labor market ... it is incumbent upon the employer to
shew that such special employment can in fact be obtained
by him. .. [I}f the accident leaves the workman's labor
in the position of an "odd-lot" in the labor market, the
employer must shew that a customer can be found who will
take it...
Judge

Cordozo

very

early

in

the

history

of

workmen's

compensation in the United States stated the policy for "Odd-Lot"
determination, as follows:
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his
request for employment with notice that labor must be
light.
The Petitioner imposing such conditions is
quickly put aside for more versatile competitors.
Business has little patience with the suitor for ease and
favor. he is the 'odd-lot7 man, the nondescript in the
labor market.
Work, if he gets it, is likely to be
casual and intermittent...Rebuff, if suffered, might
reasonably be ascribed to the narrow opportunities that
await the sick and halt. (Emphasis added). Jordan v.
Decorative Co.. 130 N.E. 635, 636 (N.Y. App. 1921).
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE IN UTAH,
The "odd-lot" doctrine has been accepted and favorably applied
by the Utah Courts.

One of the first Utah cases applying the

doctrine was Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc. et. a h , 622 P. 2d 790
(Utah 1980).

In Brundage, the Plaintiff had spent thirty years as

a truck driver.

In August 1975 he injured his back in a non-

industrial accident which led to surgery later that year.

In

October 1976 he had recovered sufficiently so he returned to his
job as a truck driver.

He subsequently re-injured his back at work
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and in 1977 again underwent surgery on his back.

Months later,

however, he re-injured his back again and was unable to return to
work thereafter.
The Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered from an
overall permanent, partial impairment of 3 0% (whole person) - half
(15%) of which was attributable to the industrial accident and half
(15%) of which was attributable to non-industrial causes.

Mr.

Brundage was awarded permanent, partial impairment benefits, but
his claim for permanent, total disability was denied.
In reversing the Industrial Commissions

ruling

regarding

permanent, total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In his
treatise
The
Law
of
Workmen / s
Compensation, Professor Arthur Larson states:
'total disability7 in compensation
law
is not to be
interpreted
literally
as utter
and
abject
helplessness....
The task is to
phrase a rule delimiting the amount
and character of work a [person] can
be able to do without forfeiting his
totally disabled status. 2 Larson,
The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §
57.51 at 10-107.
Consonant with the view expressed by Larson,
this
Court
has
adopted
the
following
definition of total disability:
This
Court
has
recognized
the
principle that a workman may be
found totally disabled if by reason
of the disability resulting from his
injury he cannot perform work of the
general character he was performing
when injured, or any other work
which a [person] of his capabilities
may be able to do or to learn to
do. . . United Park City Mines Co.,
v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802
(1964).
Mr. Hansen testified and the Administrative Law Judge found
that he could not continue to perform the work he was doing when
14

injured, and that a vocational rehabilitation expert had found him
unsuitable for rehabilitation (R. at 191).
The next important decision was Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P. 2d
495 (Utah 1981)•

Mr. Wilkins, who was 55 years old, sold trailers

and other types of recreational vehicles for Entwistle, and he was
required to travel throughout the west contacting dealers. In 1977
he suffered an injury to his back when he slipped and struck his
back on some large rocks while attempting to unhitch a trailer. He
was off work for some time while undergoing physical therapy and
later returned to work on a light duty basis, but was unable to
continue working.

In defining "total disability" the Utah Supreme

Court stated that:
...'total disability' does not mean a state of abject
helplessness or that the injured employee must be unable
to any work at all. The fact that an injured employee
may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation
in which he was injured. His temporary disability may be
found to be total if he can no longer perform the duties
of the character required in his occupation prior to his
injury. Id at 498. (citations omitted).
Mr.

Hansen

also

falls within

the

purview

and

standard

enunciated in Entwistle.
The "odd-lot" doctrine was next considered in the monumental
decision of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah
1984) .

The injured worker in that case was employed by Emery

Mining Company as a maintenance mechanic in a coal mine.

On

January 25, 1980 while leaving the mine in a tractor-trailer, he
was bounced up and down on the seat resulting in an injury to his
back. After several months of conservative medical treatment, Mr.
Marshall underwent surgery on his back, following which he was
advised by his doctor that he could not return to work.
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Mr.

Marshall was 67 years of age at the time.
The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent,
partial disability compensation finding that he had sustained a 10%
(whole person) impairment due to the accident of January 25, 1980,
and 15% (whole person) due to pre-existing conditions.

However,

the Industrial Commission denied his request for permanent, total
disability stating the primary reason he was unable to return to
work was his age.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission
ruling

that

disability

Mr.

Marshall

benefits

under

was
the

entitled
"odd-lot11

to

permanent,

doctrine,

permanent, total disability as follows:
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if
by reason of the disability resulting from his
injury he cannot perform work of the general
character he was performing when injured, or
any other work which a man of his capabilities
may be able to do or to learn to do... . Id. at
211.
* * * *

Disability is evaluated not in the abstract,
but in terms of the specific individual who
has suffered a work-related injury. An injury
to a hand would not cause the same degree of
disability in a teacher, for example, as it
would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing
the loss of earning capacity, a constellation
of factors must be considered, only one of
which is the physical impairment.
Other
factors are age, education training and mental
capacity.
It is the unique configuration of
these factors that together will determine the
impact of the impairment on the individuals
earning capacity.
Id. at 211.
(citations
omitted).
Some
employees,
however
cannot
be
rehabilitated and even though not in a state
of abject helplessness / can no longer perform
the
duties
...
required
in
[their]
occupations] .' These employees fall into the
so-called /odd-lot' category...
Whether or
16

total

defining

not an employee falls into the odd-lot
category depends on whether there is regular,
dependable work available for the employee who
does not rely on the sympathy of friends or
his won super human efforts.
Once the
employee has presented evidence that he can no
longer perform the duties required in his
occupation
and
that
he
cannot
be
rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove the existence of regular,
steady work that the employee can perform,
taking into account the employee's education,
mental capacity and age. ... 'It is much
easier for the
[employer] to prove the
employability
of
the
[employee]
for
a
particular job than for the [employee] to try
to prove the universal negative of not being
employable at any work.' Id. at 212-213.
(citations omitted). (Emphasis added)
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd-lot cases
are concerned with employees whose work involved physical labor,
were

50 years

of

age

and

older, and

had

moderate

or

little

education - which is strikingly similar to Mr. Hansen's case here.
The Respondent's have failed to appreciate this shift in
burden and that they had the burden of proving the availability of
other work for Mr. Hansen.

Their only effort in this regard was a

single letter which they sent to the wrong address.
And finally, in Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management,
725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986), the injured worker, who was sixty years
old with a limited education and even more limited work background,
suffered a fractured skull when a steel beam fell and stuck him on
the head.

He had surgery performed on his skull to relieve the

pressure on his brain.

A Medical Panel found that he had a 25%

(whole person) permanent, partial impairment, 15% (whole person) of
which

was

permanent,

related
total

to

the

disability

industrial
benefits

injury.
because

He
of

requested

his

medical

impairment and other disability factors, such as his age and lack
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of education or skills.

He was awarded only permanent, partial

disability compensation.
The

Utah

Petitioner

had

Supreme

Court

demonstrated

reversed

holding

that

was

he

that

not

once the

suitable

for

rehabilitation, "The burden shifts to the employer to prove the
x

existence of regular steady work that the employee can perform'

taking into account the Plaintiff's education, mental capacity and
age."

Id. at 1327. The Court went on to note that "... the record

is devoid of concrete evidence that he was offered work of the
general nature he had been performing."

Id. at 1327.

In conclusion, as a result of his industrial injury, Mr.
Hansen no longer performed work of the general character he was
performing when injured. A vocational rehabilitation expert in his
Social Security disability claim testified that in 1978 he was
disabled and incapable of being rehabilitated.

Respondents even

stipulated that Mr. Hansen was permanently and totally disabled.
Mr. Hansen is, therefore, entitled to permanent, total disability
benefits under the "Odd-Lot" doctrine.
Ill
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN ENTERING CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW WHICH ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHICH IT
ADOPTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY IN ITS ORDER.
Despite the age of this claim, a large quantum of medical
evidence in support of the claim, most of it contemporaneous with
the injury, was presented
1026).

totaling over 738 pages (R. at 288-

To assist in the resolution of the medical issues, a

Medical Panel was appointed which both examined Mr. Hansen and
reviewed his medical records. The Medical Panel entered a detailed
18

report,

the

conclusions

of

which

were

not

challenged

by

Respondents•
On March 18,1992 the Administrative Law Judge entered detailed
Findings of Fact which led to the inescapable conclusion that Mr.
Hansen had demonstrated legal and medical causation, and that his
totally disabling symptoms resulted from his industrial injury.
The Industrial Commission in its Order Denying Motion for
Review adopted, without modification, all of the Findings of Fact
of

the

Administrative

Commission's

Order

has

Conclusions of Law", a
discloses

Law

Judge.

a

section

Although
entitled

the

Industrial

"Discussion

and

review of that portion of the Order

that there is not a single, true Conclusion of Law

contained in it.

The Commission merely speculates that there may

be another cause of his unemployability, but does not succinctly
identify or logically analyze what evidence supports its views.
Although the Administrative Law Judge does not specifically
number her Findings of Fact, a careful reading of her decision
reveals the following relevant Findings of Fact which were adopted
by the Industrial Commission in its Order:
1.

Mr. Hansen sustained an industrial injury in the

course and scope of his employment with Respondent Salt Lake City
on May 21,1976 (R. at 173).
2.

Following his industrial injury, Mr. Hansen had

right ankle surgery on May 21,1976 and left knee surgery on
September 8,1976. He returned to work in mid-January 1977, assuming
his normal work duties (R. at 173).
3.

On April 4,1977, Mr. Hansen sustained a second

injury when, while carrying a bundle of chain link fencing, his
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left knee and right foot gave way causing him to fall to the
ground. He was unable to return to work after that injury (R. at
174) .
4.

As a result of that injury Mr. Hansen sustained a

16% permanent impairment of the whole person (R. at 188).
5.
Security

On June

Disability

Administration

13,1977, Mr. Hansen

benefits.

Although

applied

the

for

Social

Social

Security

initially denied his claim on the basis he was

capable of doing light work, a hearing was subsequently held and he
was awarded disability benefits based primarily on his right ankle
and secondarily on his left knee and back conditions. A vocational
expert found he did not have the residual functional capacity to
perform substantial gainful employment, and benefits were awarded
to begin as of May 21,1976, the date of his industrial injury (R.
at 175-76).
6.

From August of 1978 through August of 1979, Mr.

Hansen was seen by Dr. Herbertson for treatment of right ankle
pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow pain and neck pain.
Dr. Herbertson treated these conditions primarily with medication
(R. at 176).
7.

In August 1979 Mr. Hansen began seeing Dr. Jonathan

H o m e primarily for his left knee and right ankle, the areas of the
body injured in the industrial injury.

Dr. H o m e

performed a

second knee surgery on November 12,1979 and a second ankle surgery
on March 10,1980.

In September of 1980, Dr. H o m e assessed Mr.

Hansen's impairments to the left knee and right ankle at 32% of the
whole person (R. at 176) .
8.

Mr. Hansen filed a second Application for Hearing
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with the Industrial Commission and the matter was again referred to
a Medical Panel which found his impairments to be a total of 14%
(whole person), slightly less than the 16% found by the original
Panel. Additional impairment benefits were denied in the December
31,1982 Order, but additional temporary total compensation was
awarded related to the two surgeries performed by Dr. Home (R. at
177) .
9.

Prior to the May 21, 1976 industrial injury there

was no mention in Mr. Hansen's medical record of any prior injury
to his right ankle. Subsequent to the industrial injury there are
numerous

entries

reflecting

medical

treatment,

including

an

impairment rating. Likewise, for the left ankle and left knee (R.
at 178-181) . Mr. Hansen's back was injured when he was involved in
a

car

accident

in

1966,

which

resulted

in

five

days

of

hospitalization; however no medical records were presented to the
Medical Panel with regard to this injury. The record also reflects
that on April 7, 1992 he fell in a grease pit and sustained a
sprain of his lumbar sacral spine which resolved after several
months of treatment. After May 21, 1976 there are various entries
with regard to his back injury (R. at 181-183).
10.

A Medical Panel was appointed which concluded that

Mr. Hansen's whole person impairments were as follows: 12% for the
right ankle (all attributable to the May 21, 1976 accident) , 5% for
the left knee (all attributable to the May 21, 1976 accident), 10%
for the left ankle (all attributable to problems arising after the
industrial accident), 10% for the low back (2.5% attributable to
problems

existing

before

the

industrial

accident

and

7.5%

attributable to problems arising after the industrial accident),
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and

1% for macular degeneration

(all attributable to problems

arising after the industrial accident).

Mr. Hansen's additional

40% (whole person) impairment related to his pulmonary condition
was wholly attributable to problems arising after the industrial
accident (R.
11.

at 188).
The Administrative Law Judge adopted the

Findings

of the Medical Panel and noted that "There have been no real
objections to the Medical Panel findings and the Panel ratings are
not

seriously

contradicted

by

any

other

medical

evidence.

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge will use the Panel ratings
to assess the Applicant's relative physical impairments and their
impact on his permanent disability."
12.

(R. at 188).

"The Administrative Law Judge presumes that neither

of the Defendants

(the Employer nor the Employers' Reinsurance

Fund) contests that the Applicant is currently unable to return to
any of his previous work and that he is currently not susceptible
to

rehabilitation.

The

Administrative

Law

Judge

bases

this

presumption on the fact that no evidence has been presented with
respect to the Applicant's ability to work at this time and on the
fact

that

Defendants

waived

a

referral

for

a

determination

regarding the Applicant's susceptibility to rehabilitation."
at

(R.

188).
13.

The

main

issue

in

this

case

is

whether

the

Applicant's inability to work was caused by his 1976 industrial
injury.
...[I]n analyzing what is the cause of the
permanent, total disability, the proper time focus is not
necessarily on the Applicant's impairment status at the
date of the hearing, but rather his impairment status at
the date he discontinued working.
Also, physical
impairment alone is not the only relevant criteria for
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determining what is causing an individual to be unable to
work.
* * *

... The Applicant testified that his right ankle and
left knee injuries on May 21, 1976 prevented him from
doing the fairly heavy work that a glazier is required to
perform. Therefore, when he was unable to return as a
glazier for Salt Lake City Corporation in February 1977,
and because he believed he could no longer perform this
occupation, the Applicant proceeded to apply for Social
Security Disability benefits at that time.
The
Administrative Law Judge feels that it is logical that
the knee and ankle impairments prevented the heavy
lifting, prolong standing and stooping required in glass
installation.
* * *

Although logically it appears that return to work
was not completely foreclosed as of 1977, it would be
speculative to find the Applicant was susceptible to
rehabilitation at that time. No concrete evidence has
been presented to support this conclusion.
* * *

...there is simply insufficient evidence to show the
Applicant was susceptible of rehabilitation in 1977. In
1978, after hearing and testimony from a vocational
expert, it was finally determined that the Applicant was
disabled and entitled to Social Security disability
benefits.
* * *

... the Administrative Law Judge would have to say
that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the
Applicant has been disabled since the date of his
industrial injury, May 21, 1976 to the present. (R. at
190-192).
14.

In addition, the Administrative Law Judge made this

specific, significant finding:
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the
Applicant has been disabled since the industrial injury
on May 21, 1976 and that the primary cause of this
disability has been the industrial injury to the left
knee and right ankle that were sustained on May 21, 1976.
The Defendants have waived any referral to the Division
of Rehabilitation, the Administrative Law Judge finds it
is appropriate to make a final award of permanent, total
disability benefits associated with the May 21, 1976
23

industrial accident (R. at 193).
Although the Administrative Law Judge's specific Findings of
Fact are compelling and lead inescapably to the conclusion that the
Petitioner is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his
1976 industrial accident, the Industrial Commission while adopting
all

of

these

Findings

of

Fact

reaches

a

totally

different

conclusion citing the following four bases for reversal:
A.
The Social Security Determination.

In response to the compelling

nature of the Social Security Determination - and the extensive
Social Security file in the record - which was heavily relied upon
by the Administrative Law Judge, the Industrial Commission's Order
specifically concluded as follows:
In considering the issue of causation,
the Commission notes that the Social Security
Administration's determination that Mr. Hansen
was disabled from work after the 1976 injury.
However, the Commission does not know the
underlying
facts upon which
the
Social
Security
Administration
made
its
award,
whether those facts are supported by the
evidence,
or
whether
legal
principles
appropriate to workers' compensation were
applied by the Social Security Administration
in making its determination.
For those
reasons, the Commission does not place a great
deal of reliance on the Social Security
determination (R. at 260-261).
There is simply no support in the record for this conclusion.
The Industrial Commission did in fact know the underlying facts
upon which the Social Security Administration made its award.
the

Social

Security

Administration

The

proceedings

before

were

exhaustively

recited by the Administrative Law Judge and were

placed in evidence. The Commission had access to the entire Social
Security file, totaling almost 200 pages and containing 28 exhibits
24

(R. at 157-169, 842-1026).
Mr. Hansen was
Administration,
benefits,

but

initially denied

by the Social Security

was

reassessed

subsequently

and

awarded

particularly after a vocational rehabilitation expert

found that he was disabled and incapable of being retrained. There
is no basis to believe that those facts are not supported by the
evidence, and in fact there is no evidence in the record that at
the time of the Social Security determination, there were any other
disabling conditions.
The Industrial Commission further does not identify what
"legal principles appropriate to workers compensation" may not have
been applied by the Social Security Administration in making its
determination; however, it does acknowledge that the current
version of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988) requires the
Industrial Commission to follow the sequential decision-making
process of the Social Security Administration.

Although that

provision was not mandatory on the date of Mr. Hansen's injury, it
is

compelling

both

factually

and

legally.

The

Industrial

Commission's decision "not to place a great deal of weight" on the
Social Security decision, is without any basis in fact, and is
contrary to its adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's Findings
of Fact reflecting and accepting the Social Security proceedings
and findings.
B.
Permanent, Partial Impairment Rating. The Industrial Commission's
Order specifically concluded as follows:
The Commission also notes that Mr. Hansen
received a 16% permanent partial impairment
rating as a result of the 1976 accident. That
impairment rating has never changed since his
25

industrial injury.
It is insufficient to
prove that the 1976 accident caused Mr. Hansen
to be permanently and totally disabled (R. at
261) .
This alleged Conclusion merely begs the question.

Mr. Hansen

never claimed that his 16% permanent, partial impairment rating,
standing alone, was sufficient to prove that he was permanently and
totally disabled.

Similarly, it is also not necessary for Mr.

Hansen's impairment rating to have increased since his last rating
in

order

for

disability.

him

to

be

found

entitled

to

permanent,

total

This is not a requirement of Utah Workers Compensation

law.
It is, however, significant to note that the Administrative
Law

Judge

specifically

found

- and

the

Industrial

Commission

adopted the finding - that:
Physical impairment alone is not the only relevant
criteria for determining what is causing an individual to
be unable to work. In determining whether an industrial
injury
causes
permanent,
total
disability,
the
Administrative Law Judge finds it is appropriate to look
at the time at which the Applicant discontinued working
and then to determine what factor or factors (including,
but not limited to physical impairment) caused the
Applicant to discontinue his/her working status (R. at
191) .
This is a reflection of the Marshall, et al., legal standard.
The Industrial Commission's

isolation of the single factor of

impairment is contrary to Utah law.
limited

observation

is

simply

The Industrial Commission's

insufficient

to

overcome

the

otherwise extensive and uncontroverted evidence contained in the
record.
C.
Failure to Timely Claim Entitlement to Permanent, Total Disability.
The Industrial Commission's Order specifically noted as follows:
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Mr. Hansen filed two claims for workers'
compensation benefits within a few years of
the 1976 accident and thus was before the
Commission twice,
but neither time did he
claim to be permanently and totally disabled
(R. at 261).
The Industrial Commission's Order also noted:
The fact that Mr. Hansen waited 14 years to
raise his claim does not reduce his burden of
proof, or shift that burden of proof to his
employer.
Had he raised his claim earlier,
both parties could have provided better
evidence (R. at 261).
Utah

Workers

Compensation

law,

for

industrial

accidents

occurring prior to July 1, 1988, did not contain any statute of
limitation

for

filing

a

workers

compensation

claim

alleging

entitlement to permanent, total disability benefits.
Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975).
Commission, 692 P.2d

783

See, e.g., Mecham v. Industrial

(Utah 1984) and Buxton v.

Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978).
not obligated

Utah Code

Industrial

Therefore, Mr. Hansen was

to request permanent, total disability

benefits

immediately following his industrial accident, or any particular
time thereafter, because there was no limitation period which
required him to do so.

The Industrial Commission's implication

that his failure to request permanent, total disability benefits
either when he filed his earlier two claims, or earlier than 14
years after his industrial accident, somehow detracted from his
position that his 1976 industrial accident caused his eventual
unemployability is without merit - legally and factually.

He was,

simply put, not required to file within any particular time frame,
and did not waive his eventual claim in any way by not filing until
1990.
The Industrial Commission's additional observation that "had
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he raised his claim earlier, both parties could have provided
better evidence" is ludicrous (R. at 261) (Emphasis added).

This

observation is nothing more than pure speculation, the lack of
support of which underscores its obvious specious nature.
And finally, it is significant to note that the Industrial
Commission does not in any way indicate what this particular
Conclusion of Law or gratuitous observation means or how it impacts
analysis

of the causation

question.

The

subject

is simply

mentioned and dropped without explanation, and this Court should
similarly treat the Industrial Commissions purported or implied
basis for denial.
D.
Failure to Return to Work.

The Industrial Commission's Order

specifically noted as follows:
Finally, the Commission notes that Mr.
Hansen did not actually return to work after
the 1976 accident. However, his failure to
return to work may be attributable to reasons
other than his injury and is therefore given
little weight (R. at 61).
This Conclusion of Law is also simply not supported by the
Findings of Fact in the record.

The Industrial Commission never

suggests what other reasons the failure to return to work could be
attributable to, opining merely that his inability to return to
work could be attributable to some other cause.

The Industrial

Commission does not make a single Finding of Fact which would
suggest that there is any other specific basis for Mr. Hansen's
inability to return to work other than his industrial accident.
Without more, this conclusion must fail.
Although the Industrial Commission notes that Mr. Hansen was
released

for light duty work during 1977, and that sometime
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thereafter he began suffering pulmonary problems, there is no
medical evidence to suggest that Mr, Hansen's inability to work
following his industrial injury was caused by anything other than
his industrial accident:

Shortly after his 1976 accident, Mr. Hansen
began suffering pulmonary problems then [sic]
other assorted medical problems, which have
been appraised by a Medical Panel as much more
significant
and
debilitating
than
his
industrial injury (R. at 261) .
Nowhere in the record is there any serious suggestion that Mr.
Hansen ceased working because of pulmonary problems that first
manifested themselves well after his industrial accident occurred
and for which he subsequently sought surgery in the early 1980's.
The cause-effect relationship is briefly related in the Industrial
Commission

Order without

any

further

analysis

or reasoning.

Similarly, "other assorted medical problems" also referenced in the
Industrial Commission Order are not detailed or analyzed.

The

conclusion that they were "appraised by a Medical Panel as much
more significant and debilitating than his industrial injury" is
similarly unsupported, unexplained and unreasoned. The simple fact
of the matter is, the Conclusions of Law are without merit and are
unsupported by the Findings of Fact entered by the Administrative
Law Judge and adopted by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial
Commissions Conclusions of Law are speculative, and speculation,
without more, is simply insufficient to support the Industrial
Commission's Order below.
In conclusion, there is simply no evidence which can be
marshaled, nor any findings made by the Administrative Law Judge or
the Industrial Commission, which would support the conclusion that
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Mr. Hansen has not established that his permanent, total disability
was caused by his industrial accident.

The failure to award him

permanent, total disability benefits cannot be and is not supported
by the record as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully requested that
this Court reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and
enter an Order awarding permanent, total disability benefits to Mr.
Hansen based upon:
(1)

the Findings of Fact entered by the Administrative

Law Judge and adopted by the Industrial Commission;
(2) the uncontroverted evidence contained in the record;
and
(3)

the

lack

of

any

substantive

evidence

or

legal

analysis whatsoever referenced in the Industrial Commission's Order
allegedly supportive of its final agency action.
DATED this 17th day of January, 199£.

VIRGTWTUS DABNEY,|ES{
Attorney for Petition*

i
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Ray L. Montgomery, Esq,
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451 South State Suite 505
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(2 copies)
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Post Office Box 510250
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Mr. Gerald R. Hansen
1885 West Bowling Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

(1 copy)

File

(1 copy)

VIRGINIA* T)ABNEYj; Ei
Attorney) for PetiVtionet

V
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975)

EXHIBIT B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of
the Administrative Law Judge (March 18, 1993).

EXHIBIT C:

Order Denying Motion for Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah (May 13, 1994).
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In eases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662^9^' of bis average weekly wages at
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $3 for a dependent wife and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week.
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee ; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662,4%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of eighteen years, up to jt maximum of fou^ such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week out of t h a t special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein..

EXHIBIT A

Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week.
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer
or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all jfcther cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected b u t where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week for 312 weeks.
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HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April
14, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by
Virginius Dabney, Attorney.
The defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation (SelfInsured), was represented by Ray Montgomery,
Attorney.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to a May 21, 1976 industrial accident resulting in
injuries to the applicant7s right ankle and his left knee. At the
time of the hearing, the self-insured employer and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund argued that the applicant was not entitled to
permanent total disability benefits because the applicant's
disabling condition was his non-industrial pulmonary obstruction
and not the orthopedic problems that resulted from the industrial
accident. The Employers Reinsurance Fund pointed out that the
applicants orthopedic problems have remained static in the 16
years since the industrial accident (or may have even improved),
while the pulmonary problems have become more symptomatic. The
applicant responded that he never returned to work after his trial
re-employment in 1977 and that he was awarded Social Security
ECHIBIT B
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Disability with the onset date being the same date as the
industrial accident date. The applicant also pointed out that he
was 63 years old# had only a 9th grade education and had no
transferable skills. He testified that he has not worked since
1977 because his right ankle and left knee, in combination, prevent
him from doing the physical work that he has done for a living all
his life.
Just prior to the hearing, the defendant/self--insured
employer filed a hearing memorandum in which the employer argued
the addtional defense that the applicant was barred from pursuing
a permanent total disability claim for having failed to file an
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission within 3
years of the date of the last payment of compensation (last payment
asserted by the employer to have been in January of 1983 with the
application for hearing on the permanent total disability claim
being filed in November of 1990). Counsel for the employer cited
U.C.A. 35-1-99 for this statute of limitations.
At hearing,
counsel was provided with the citations for Mecham v. Industrial
Commission, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984) and Buxton v. Industrial
Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978) as precedent for the
proposition that there is no separate statute of limitations for
permanent total disability claims once the initial filing
requirements are met. However, counsel reasserted the U.C.A. 35-199 3-year statute of limitations defense post-hearing in a letter
to the ALJ dated April 24, 1992, indicating that he had reviewed
the cited cases and found they were distinguishable from the
instant case. In the same letter, counsel cites the 1990 amendment
to U.C.A. 35-1-98, which does specify a 6-year statute of
limitations for permanent total disability claims.
Because the applicant has a history of a number of injuries
and/or medical problems, after the hearing, the matter was referred
to a medical panel to have the applicant's impairments rated and
apportioned as to those existing prior to the industrial accident,
those caused by the industrial accident and those developing
subsequent to the industrial accident. The medical panel report
was received on November 12, 1992 and was distributed to the
parties on November 13, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections.
On November 30, 1992, counsel for the applicant submitted a letter
to the ALJ requesting that the panel clarify when the applicant's
pulmonary impairment occurred. The ALJ sent a letter to the panel
chairman on December 1, 1992 requesting clarification and the
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chairman responded in a letter received at the Commission on
January 4, 1993. This clarification report was distributed to the
parties on January 6, 1993, with an additional 15 days allowed for
objections.
On January 14, 1993, counsel for the applicant wrote the ALJ
requesting a tentative finding of permanent total disability and
requesting that the attorneys for the self-insured employer and the
Employers Reinsurance Fund waive the statutorily mandated-referral
to the Utah State Office of Education Division of Rehabilitation.
Counsel renewed this request in another letter received at the
Commission on January 25, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the ALJ
received a letter from counsel for the employer indicating that no
waiver was being made, because the employer felt that the
industrial injury did not cause the applicant to be permanently
totally disabled (primarily because the majority of the applicant's
impairment was related to the non-industrial pulmonary condition).
On February 22, 1993, the ALJ also received a letter from the
Employers Reinsurance Fund which indicates that the Fund agreed
with the employer that the permanent total disability was not
caused by the industrial injury.
Counsel for the applicant
responded to the letters of the employer and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund in a letter dated February 23, 1993, indicating
that even before the development of the pulmonary condition, the
Social Security Administration had found the applicant disabled as
of the date of the industrial accident.
On March 2, 1993, the ALJ wrote counsel for the employer and
the Employers Reinsurance Fund requesting that they waive the
statutory referral to the Division of Rehabilitation as logically
it did not seem possible that the Division would attempt to offer
rehabilitation to the applicant considering his age and long time
unemployed status. The ALJ noted that she was not requesting a
waiver of any of the defenses either party had asserted up to that
point, merely just a waiver of the rehabilitation referral. On
March 3, 1993 counsel for the Employers Reinsurance Fund provided
the ALJ with a stipulation to waive the referral and on March 8,
1993 counsel for the employer provided the ALJ with a stipulation
to waive the referral.
On March 11, 1993, counsel for the
applicant filed another letter reiterating that the pulmonary
problems were
never
considered
by the
Social
Security
Administration in awarding the applicant disability benefits and
indicating that the applicant was awarded the benefits based on
orthopedic problems that included the right ankle and left knee
problems that were caused by the 1976 industrial injury at issue.
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The matter was considered ready for a final order as of March 8,
1993 when the ALJ received the final stipulation to waive the
rehabilitation referral from the employer.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 47 years old on the date of
injury, May 21, 1976, and who had a wife and one minor child as of
that date. In school, the applicant completed the 9th grade and
did attend the 10th grade for a part of a year. The applicant
testified that he can read, but stated that his writing was
somewhat illegible. The first employment that he can recall was
when he drove a pick-up truck for United Supply Delivery. Right
after that, the applicant started to work as a glazier and did this
for the rest of his employment life. The applicant was employed
with Salt Lake City Corporation on the date of injury, having been
hired by Salt Lake City on March 2, 1971. The applicant worked as
a maintenance man and glazier at the Salt Lake City Airport. The
applicant plowed runways in the winter using heavy equipment and
mowed lawns during the spring and summer. He operated other heavy
equipment as well, including front end loaders, backhoes and
graders. The applicant also was an experienced glazier and had
worked as a glazier for Granite School District from May 1965
through February 1971. Part of the applicants responsibilities at
the Salt Lake City Airport was installing glass. The applicant was
earning $950.00 per month as of the date of injury, or
approximately $219.40 per week. On May 21, 1976, the applicant was
unloading a crate of glass when the crate tipped over and the glass
fell on the applicant, primarily effecting his right lower
extremity.
The applicant had surgery on his right ankle on May 21, 1976
and later had left knee surgery on September 8, 1976, which was
determined to be related to the industrial accident as well.
Almost immediately after the surgery on the left knee, the
applicant was hospitalized again for a pulmonary embolus.
Approximately mid-January 1977, the applicant returned to work for
Salt Lake City Corporation, apparently doing his normal work
duties. The applicant recalls returning to work in December of
1976, but the majority of the documentary evidence reflects a
return to work on approximately January 13, 1977. On approximately
February 4, 1977, the applicant was at work carrying a bundle of
chain link fencing when his left knee and right foot gave way,
causing him to fall to the ground. It is not clear whether or not
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the applicant actually caused any aggravation to his left knee or
right foot when this occurred, but he did not return to work after
that injury. The applicant stated that the combination of problems
with his left knee and right ankle caused him to be unable to walk
and stand for any time, caused inability to lift greater than 25
pounds and prevented him from bending and stooping. He testified
that Salt Lake City told him that he was terminated because he was
unable to perform the duties that were required of him at the Salt
Lake City Airport. However, Salt Lake City presented a copy of a
May 10, 1977 letter sent to the applicant indicating that he was to
go to personnel to see what other jobs might be available to him.
At hearing, it was determined that the letter was not sent to the
applicant's proper home address and the applicant does not recall
receiving the letter.
On May 24, 1977, Dr. E. Heyes, the orthopedic surgeon that
performed both the ankle and knee surgery following the industrial
accident, wrote a letter to Salt Lake City Corporation indicating
that the applicant could return to light duty work operating a
motor vehicle as of April 25, 1977.
However, the applicant
testified that he was unable to operate a clutch vehicle due to his
left knee and therefore was only able to drive a vehicle with an
automatic transmission. The applicant testified at hearing that he
could not really remember the events that transpired in mid-1977
with respect to his failed return to work. He recalls only that he
was unable to perform the work that he had performed all his life
(presumably glass installation) because of the left knee and right
ankle injuries and he recalls that there was no light duty
available to him at the airport.
On June 13, 1977, the applicant applied for social security
disability and on June 17, 1977, the applicant filed an application
for hearing with the Industrial Commission because he felt that the
impairment ratings he had been given were inusfficient (Dr. Heyes
had rated the ankle at 15% and the left knee at 5%, but his ratings
were non-specific and thus it is unclear if he was rating the lower
extremity or the whole person). From June of 1977 through May of
1978, the applicant was involved in litigating both his claim for
social security disability benefits and his claim for additional
workers compensation impairment benefits. During this time, the
applicant got no treatment for either his left knee or his right
ankle. However, he did begin to see Dr. W. Hebertson during this
period, in October of 1977, for back pain.
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The Industrial Commission litigation:
A hearing was held on September 19, 1977. The
matter was referred to a medical panel for
additional input with respect to what impairments
resulted due to the industrial accident.
The
medical panel report was issued on March 21, 197'8
and rated the right foot at 12% whole person and
the left knee at 5% whole person, for-a total
industrial impairment of 16% whole person.
The
panel concluded that the back problems and right
elbow problems were not related to the May 21, 1976
industrial accident. The panel report indicates
that the panel relied on office notes of Dr. E.
Heyes dated prior to the industrial accident for
their conclusion that the right elbow problems preexisted the industrial accident.
Those office
notes are not included in the medical record
exhibit (Exhibit A-l) presently being utilized for
the instant litigation. On May 10, 1978, Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered
awarding the applicant temporary total compensation
(TTC) from May 22, 1976 though January 12, 1977 and
from February 4, 1977 through April 25, 1977 and
awarding permanent impairment benefits based on the
16% whole person rated by the panel.
The Social Security Litigation:
Responding to the applicants June 13, 1977
application
for
disability
benefits,
Social
Security denied the application on September 29,
1977, stating that the applicant was capable of
doing light work.
On October 31, 1977, the
applicant filed a request for reconsideration,
indicating that his movement was so resticted that
he could not work. He noted that the doctor had
told him that he didn't want the applicant even
looking for work and didn't want the applicant
going to school until he was recovered.
The
applicant asserted that he could only walk with a
cane and could do no lifting.
On December 13,
1977, Social Security again denied benefits,
indicating that the applicant could still do
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sedentary work and that his experience as a glazier
resulted in him having transferable skills. On
January 27, 1978, the applicant filed a request for
hearing.
On May 31, 1978, the applicant was
awarded disability benefits based primarily on the
right ankle and secondarily on the low back, with
the left knee mentioned as an additional problem.
Apparently, the Social Security ALJ relied a great
deal on the testimony of a vocational expert who
found that the applicant did not have the-residual
functional capacity to perform substantial gainful
employment. The benefits awarded were to begin as
of May 21, 1976.

From August of 1978 through August of 1979, the applicant
saw Dr. Hebertson almost exclusively. Dr. Hebertson's office notes
are brief and illegible and his periodic letters to Salt Lake City
Corporation are very brief.
Dr. Hebertson just lists the
applicant's complaints in his letters and office notes and those
include: right ankle pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow
pain, and neck pain. Apparently, the only treatment provided by
Dr. Hebertson was presciption medication. This medication included
percodan or percocet (apparently at one point tylox was
substituted), either dalmane, Seconal, nebutal or halcion, Valium,
and varying combinations of rela, indocin or fiorinal.
The
frequency and amount of percodan or percocet was gradually
increased during 1979 and 1980. By 1981, the amount prescribed was
a regular and consistent 100 per month. This continued along with
the other medications through 1988, when the the amount of
percodan/percocet was reduced to 60 per month. The prescription
refill notes continue in Dr. Hebertson's records through 1990.
In August of 1979, the applicant began alternating his
visits with Dr. Hebertson with visits to Dr. Jonathon Home. The
applicant saw Dr. Home for his left knee and right ankle and per
numerous indications in Dr. Horne/s notes, the applicant told Dr.
H o m e that he could not take medication for his knee and ankle due
to an ulcer problem. Dr. H o m e was thus under the impression that
some other form of treatment was necessary. Dr. H o m e performed a
second knee surgery on November 12, 1979 and a second ankle surgery
on March 10, 1980. The applicant saw Dr. H o m e regularly, in
between visits to Dr. Hebertson, through September of 1980. In
September of 1980, Dr. H o m e rated the applicants impairment to
the left knee and right ankle at 32% whole person (twice the amount
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rated by the previous medical panel) and this prompted the
applicant to file a second application for hearing with the
Industrial Commission. The matter was again referred to a medical
panel which rated the applicant's impairment at a total of 14%
whole person (actually less than the 16% rated by the original
panel). Additional impairment benefits were denied in the final
order (issued on December 31, 1982) but additional temporary total
compensation was awarded, apparently related to the two additional
surgeries performed by Dr. Home.
From October 1980 through March of 1982, the applicant
alternated between seeing Dr. Hebertson for his presciptions and
going to the VA Hospital for pulmonary related problems.
In
October of 1982, the applicants Social Security disabilty award
came up for review and the applicant represented to Social Security
at that time that he needed 2 canes to walk, that he didn't drive,
that he needed assistance bathing and that he was unable to do
anything physical. In connection with the review, Dr. H o m e issued
a report in November of 1982 indicating that the applicant would
need a right ankle arthrodesis within the next year or two because
of increased arthritis in the foot joints. Dr. Home noted that
the applicant's foot was likely to get worse and that the applicant
could only walk one block before he experienced severe pain in the
foot.
Dr. G. Zeluff did an examination and analysis of the
applicant's condition in December of 1982, apparently at the
request of Social Security. His report sates that he felt the
applicant's complaints were out of proportion to his examination
findings.
He noted that there was only minimal degenerative
changes in the back, right ankle and left knee. Dr. Hebertson also
did a report for Social Security in December of 1982 and just lists
the applicant's complaints as: right chest soreness, low back pain,
right foot pain, pain and swelling in the left knee, intrascapular
pain, arthritic finger pain and headaches. Dr. Hebertson notes
that he had done no range of motion testing, had taken no X-rays
and had done no inquiry with respect to the applicant's activity
restrictions.
On January 11, 1983, the applicant's Social Security
benefits were discontinued. The decision to discontinue benefits
notes that the applicant was able to do substantial gainful
activity as of January of 1983, It was noted that the applicant's
breathing capacity was "O.K." and that his loss of range of motion
in the ankle, head and back was only moderate, with no loss of
range of motion in the left knee. The arthritis in the left knee
and right ankle was determined to be moderate and it was decided
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that the applicant could use his hands and arms without
restricition.
It was noted that the applicant could walk
adequately and that he could perform light work. Transferable
skills were found to exist. On March 7, 1983, the applicant filed
a request for reconsideration and on October 26, 1983, benefits
were reinstated.
The reinstatement decision indicates that a
combination of problems caused the applicant to be disabled.
Specifically noted was the applicants arthritis, secondary to his
orthopedic problems. It was determined that the arthritis caused
incapacitating pain. The applicant's residual functional capacity
was determined to be at the sedentary level, with the applicant
having no transferable skills. The applicant's advanced age, and
his minimal education were also noted.
Benefits were awarded
continuous from May 21, 1976.
From March of 1983 through May of 1985, the applicant saw
Dr. Hebertson primarily for his prescriptions, with only an
occasional visit to Dr. Home. In August of 1983, a Dr. R. Daynes
wrote the applicant after examining him and stated that it was
advisable for the applicant to reduce his daily percodan intake as
well as his alcohol intake.
Beginning in June of 1985, the
applicant saw only Dr. Hebertson through August of 1987. The
applicant continued to see Dr. Hebertson only through August of
1990, except that he had continuing visits to the VA Hospital for
his pulmonary problems.
III.

Specific Problems:

In order to make it easier for the medical panel to assess
the impairments, the ALJ presented the panel with the following
list of specific problems noted in the medical records, with a
breakdown based on what problems surfaced prior to the industrial
accident and which became apparent only after the industrial
accident.
A.

RIGHT ANKLE:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical

records
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2. After May 21, 1976 5-21-76

SURGERY - by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital
- Procedure: repair of laceration of posterior
deltoid ligament

2-4-77

slip and fall when applicant attempted return to
work - treated by Dr. Heyes

9-1-77

continuing problems described by Dr. D. Loken as
pain in the foot and ankle except if the
applicant walked on the lateral border of the
foot, with numbness in the heel, and swelling of
the ankle - rated at 10% (non-specific with
respect to lower extremity or whole man)

3-21-78

Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
ankle at 12% whole person

9-19-79

Dr. J. H o m e attempts treating ankle with a short
leg walking cast - this apparently is helpful
with the applicant supposedly telling Dr. H o m e
that he was able to run up or down stairs by
October of 1979

12-19-79 Dr. J. H o m e tries using a leather brace to treat
the ankle and indicates that the applicant may
someday need a fusion - the ankle brace does not
improve the applicant's symptoms
2-11-80

Dr. J. H o m e does an X-ray of the ankle and notes
increased bone chips

3-10-80

SURGERY - by Dr. J. H o m e at Cottonwood Hospital
- Procedure: arthrotomy and excision of bone
spurs of fibula and talus - in follow-up, by 4-80
Dr. H o m e notes that the applicant is able to
walk with a flat foot, but aching still is
present

6-7-80

CT scan done at Western Neurological Associates
is read to show the only abnormality to be soft
tissue calcifications just below the lateral
malleous
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6-23-80

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the ankle still swells
and has pain and he rates the ankle at 30% of the
lower extremity

6-28-82

Dr. J. H o m e lists the diagnosis for the ankle as
subtalar joint arthritis and mild recurrent spurs
in the fibula/talar joint - he tries treating the
arthritis with feldene

11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
ankle at 19% of the lower extremity (8% whole
person) and finds that a fusion may be necessary
in the distant future
11-29-82 Dr. J. H o m e tells Social Security that the
applicant will need an arthrodesis of the ankle
in the next year or two due to increased
arthritis in the foot joints
B. LEFT ANKLE
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical
records
2. After May 21, 1976 11-24-84 the applicant is seen at Cottonwood Hospital for
a left ankle sprain - Dr. Home follows-up with
at short leg cast and the injury is apparently
resolved by December of 1984 when the cast is
removed
C. LEFT KNEE
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical
records
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2. After May 21, 1976 9-8-76

SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Marias Hospital Procedure: arthrostomy followed by arthrotomy and
medical menisectomy

9-1-77

Dr. D. Loken describes continuing problems as
numbness in the lateral aspect, with the knee
giving out when weight is placed on it - it is
noted that the applicant needs to hold on to
something when he is going upstairs - Dr. Loken
rates the knee at 5% of the lower extremity

3-21-78

Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
knee at 5% whole person

11-12-79 SURGERY by Dr. J. H o m e at Cottonwood Hospital Procedure: 1) arthroscopy, 2) debridement of
chondromalacia (patella), 3) debridement of
chondromalacia
(medial femoral condyle) 4)
lateral fasciotomy - Post-operative diagnosis:
severe chondromalacia of patella medial femoral
condyle left knee, scarred superpatellar synovial
band left knee
6-23-80

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the knee still swells and
is painful -he rates the knee at 20% of the lower
extremity

11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
left knee at 14% of the lower extremity or 6%
whole person - the panel finds that a joint
replacement may be necessary in the distant
future
D. BACK
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 1966

per the applicant's testimony, he was involved in
a car accident in 1966 which resulted in the need
for 5 days of traction in the hospital
(Cottonwood Hospita) - medical records for this
incident are not included in the current medical
record exhibit
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4-7-72

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the applicant fell in a
grease pit and landed on his left hip - this
caused the applicant to twist his low back and
bruise the left iliac crest - diagnosed as a
sprain/strain of the lumbosacral spine, doubted
herniated nucleous pulpous - treated with
percodan, robaxin and a lumbosacral corset apparently resolved after several months of
seeing Dr. H o m e - unclear if this accident is
the same one mentioned by the applicant at
hearing in which he fell backwards and hit his
low back (about 2 inches above the tailbone) on a
concrete edge

2. After May 21, 1976 4-1-77

Dr. D. Loken notes that the back pain began about
February or March of 1977 (around the time that
the applicant fell with the chain link fence upon
attempting to return to work after the industrial
accident of 5-21-76) - Dr. Loken notes no
neurological findings and no X-ray findings

9-27-77

Dr. E. Heyes writes Social Security and indicates
that the applicant felt that the back pain he was
having was due to his limping - D. Heyes notes
that this is possible

10-17-77 Dr. Hebertson notes that the applicant may have
twisted his back when he was carrying the chain
link fence at work around February 4, 1977
1-78 through 5-78
Dr.
Hebertson
makes
repeated
notations
that the applicant needs to have a myelogram apparently this is never done
1-17-83

Dr. H o m e notes that the applicant has had back
pain on and off since the 1966 car accident - he
notes no neurological findings and normal
reflexes, range of motion, sensation and power Dr. Home's diagnosis is: 1) mild degenerative
changes, narrowing at L5-S1, 2) mild herniation
or possible herniation at L5-S1 and 3) chronic
sprain/strain of lumbosacral spine
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5-1-85

the applicant sees Dr. H o m e regarding back pain

E. RIGHT ELBOW:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
3-21-78

the medical panel report of this date indicates
that the panel had office notes of Dr. E. Heyes
varifying a right elbow condition treated by Dr.
Heyes prior to the industrial accident - these
office notes are not included in the present
medical record exhibit

2. After May 21, 1976:
6-8-77

SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital Procedure: exploration and partial division of
annular ligament

9-1-77

Dr. D. Loken finds that the right elbow has
minimal symptoms at this point

F. LEFT ELBOW:
1. Prior to May 21# 1976:
6-8-70

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the applicant had a left
elbow contusion while fishing

2. After May 21, 1976:
4-2-86

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the applicant fell on his
left elbow
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G. PULMONARY PROBLEMS:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
3-14-72

a chest X-ray at St. Mark's Hospital (apparently
taken while the applicant was an inpatient for an
ulcer) shows some findings

5-21-76

while the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's
Hospital for his right ankle industrial injury,
the records note that the applicant had pneumonia
in 1974 leaving right lower lobe scars - the
records also note that the applicant is being
followed by Dr. Abaunza for repeated shortness of
breath

2. After May 21, 1976:

9-13-76 through 9-21-76
the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's
Hospital for chest pain and a suspected pulmonary
embolus and is treated by Dr. K. Ritchie with
anti-coagulants
10-14-80 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for a 6week cough - it is noted that the applicant is a
40-50 pack year smoker
10-22-80 through 11-13-80 the applicant is hospitalized at
the VA Hospital for an abnormal mass seen on a
chest X-ray - the applicant undergoes a number of
procedures including: 1) a bronchoscopy on 10-2480, 2) a rigid brondchoscopy and right middle and
right lower lobectomy on 10-31-80 - the discharge
diagnosis is: endobrachial hamartoma, right lower
lobe
1-7-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an
upper respiratory tract infection
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2-24-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
post-surgical thoracic pain which is treated with
an intercostal block injection and elavil

3-22-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
chest wall pain

4-25-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
pleural effusion

5-81

the applicant is seen at the University Hospital
Pain Clinic for difficulty managing the postsurgical chest pain

5-19-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
acute bronchitis

3-7-92

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
chest wall pain

11-17-82 the Industrial Commission medical panel finds
that the applicant's respiratory problems are due
to a tumor which may have been present as early
as the date of injury (5-21-76) but is unrelated
causally to the industrial accident
3-7-85

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital as a
result of upper respiratory tract infections with
sharp chest pain in December of 1984 and January
of 1985

12-22-87, 12-29-87 and 1-9-88
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and/or
chronic bronchitis
9-26-88

pulmonary fucntion tests are done at the VA
Hospital and it is determined that the applicant
has moderate obstruction

11-5-88

the applicnat is seen at the VA Hospital for
chest pain - an EKG is read as normal - followups occur on 11-22-88 and 11-28-88

1-24-89

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an
increase in his chronic shortness of breath
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3-7-89

pulmonary function tests are done at the VA
Hospital and it is again determined that the
applicant has moderate obstruction

3-29-89 through 4-5-89
the applicant is an in-patient at the VA Hospital
due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease follow-up occurs on 5-30-89
6-10-89, 7-19-89, 7-21-89
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital due to
acute exacerbations of his chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease
H. HEADACHES
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
1947

the applicant is struck in the head by a hoist
cable while unloading a boat while he was in the
military - the applicant recalls that he had loss
of conciousness, possibly for more than one day,
and he develops periodic headaches thereafter

2. After May 21, 1976:
12-80

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
syncope, dizzy spells and nausea and an acoustic
neuroma is ruled out - extensive testing occurs

8-14-87

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
headaches which is noted to be related to a head
trauma in the service - it is noted that the
headaches have increased over the last few years
and that the headaches are associated with
photophobia

9-3-87

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital in
follow-up on his headaches and elvavil is
prescribed
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I. PSYCHIATRIC
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
1964

the applicant is voluntarily committed to a
hospital in California - the applicant testified
that he was there for 2 months and received
therapy and medication during his stay - per the
applicant'& testimony, he was depressed and had
put his fist through a wall prior to his
admission without provocation

2. After May 21, 1976:
5-81 though 7-81
the applicant is taught relaxation
techniques at the VA Hospital to deal with his
post-surgical chest pain -the applicant is also
given amitriptylline

Briefly mentioned in the medical records or testimony were
several things that developed prior to May 21, 1976. The applicant
was hospitalized (at St, Mark's Hospital) in March of 1972 for an
ulcer problem and Dr. W. Hebertson did a consult during this
hospital stay for hand/arm numbness that the applicant was
experiencing. The applicant also had some neck problems associated
with the back injury that he had in the 1966 car accident. Dr.
Hebertson lists neck complaints occasionally in his list of
symptoms that he was treating with "drug therapy." The applicant
also had some vision impairment prior to the industrial accident
which the applicant contends is verified by the 4-6-76 report of
Dr. Quinn that is attached to the top of the medical record
exhibit. In addition, the applicant states that he feels that his
hearing got gradually worse after he got out of the service and
thus he feels that he had some hearing loss at the time of the
industrial accident, but there are no medical records regarding his
hearing dated prior to the industrial accident.
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The medical panel consisted of Dr. M. Thomas, a neurologist,
Dr. W. Hess, an orthopedist and Dr. R. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist.
The panel concluded that the applicant's whole person impairment
was as follows: 12% for the right ankle (all attributable to the 521-76 accident), 5% for the left knee (all attributable to the 521-76 accident) , 2% for the left ankle (all attributable to
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident), 10% for the low
back (2.5% attrtibutable to problems existing BEFORE the industrial
accident and 7.5% attributable to problems arising AFTER the
industrial accident) and 1% for the applicant's macular
degeneration (all attributable to problems arising AFTER the
industrial accident). The panel found that the applicant had 0%
permanent impairment related to the following problems noted in the
medical records: right elbow status post division of annular
ligament, somatoform pain disorder and thinking disorder (in
remission), and headahces. Per the clarification report submitted
by the panel at the ALJ's request on January 4, 1993, the
applicant's 40% whole person impairment related to the pulmonary
condition (status post-partial pneumonectomy for hamartoma with
COPD, moderate impairment, stable) was wholly attributable to
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Preliminary Conclusions:
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel with
respect to the applicant's impairment ratings and the indications
as to when the impairments arose.
There have been no real
objections to the panel findings and the panel ratings are not
seriously contradicted by any other medical evidence. Therefore,
the ALJ will use the panel ratings to assess the applicant's
relative physical impairments and their impact on his permanent
disability. The ALJ presumes that neither defendant (the employer
nor the Employers Reinsurance Fund) contests a finding that the
applicant is currently unable to return to any of his previous work
and that he is currently not susceptible to rehabilitation. The
ALJ bases this presumption on the fact that no evidence has been
presented with respect to the applicant's ability to work at this
time and on the fact that the defendants have waived a referral for
a determination regarding the applicant's susceptibility to
rehabilitation.
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Statute of Limitations:
The ALJ finds that the applicant is not barred from claiming
permanent total disability benefits due to the 3-year filing
requirement in U.C.A. 35-1-99, as it read on the date of the
applicant's industrial injury, or due to the 1990 amendment to
U.C.A. 35-1-98, as counsel for the employer has argued. The ALJ
finds that the 1990 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-98 (specifying a 6year statute of limitations for permanent total disability claims)
is not applicable, because that amendment was enacted 14 years
after the applicant's date of injury. The employer has provided no
explanation regarding why this amended version of U.C.A. 35-1-98
should apply to this case, and thus the ALJ will simply follow the
well established principal that the law as of the date of injury is
the correct law to apply. Although the ALJ finds that the U.C.A.
35-1-99 provision cited by counsel for the employer was the law at
the time of the applicant's injury, the ALJ finds that case law
narrowly limits the application of that 3-year filing requirement
so that it does not bar the applicant's claim in this case.
The Mecham case cited at the beginning of this order is
factually almost identical to this case.
In that case, the
applicant had a 1961 injury which was litigated at the Industrial
Commission from 1964 through 1966. Pursuant to that litigation,
the applicant was awarded benefits for a permanent partial
impairment only. The last payment of compensation was made in
December of 1964. It was not until December of 1982, that the
applicant formally filed a claim for permanent total disability
benefits with the Commission. The claim was dismissed by the ALJ
because the claim was filed more than 3 years after the last
payment of compensation. The Supreme Court reversed this ruling,
noting that the applicant had met the 3-year filing requirement,
because reports were filed just after the date of injury by the
employer and the applicant's physicians. The Court found that the
filing of these reports created jurisdiction for the Commission and
that to determine if there was any further time limits for filing,
one had to consult the particular statute dealing with the kind of
benefits being claimed (in the case of permanent total disability
benefits, the particular statute is U.C.A. 35-1-67). The Court
found that U.C.A. 35-1-67 contained no separate time limit for
filing a permanent total disability claim and thus the 18 year time
lapse between the last payment of compensation and the 1982 filing
with the Commission did not act as a bar to the applicant's
permanent total disability claim.
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The ALJ does not understand why counsel for the employer
feels that the Mecham case is not on point. One need only change
the dates and the facts are almost identical. Absent some better
explanation from counsel as to why he feels the Mecham case is
inapplicable, the ALJ must conclude that the Mecham case is the
ruling precedent on the applicability of the U.C.A. 35-1-99 3-year
statute of limitations to the instant case. Based on the Court's
ruling in Mecham, the applicant in the instant case met the 3-year
filing requirement back in 1976 when reports were filed with the
Commission and thus he does not need to again meet the requirement
after the last payment of compensation in order to file a permanent
total disability claim. Based on this ruling, the ALJ will proceed
to decide the merits of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability benefits.

The Cause of the Permanent Total Disability:
The main issue in this case is whether the applicant's
inability to work has been caused by the 1976 industrial injury.
Counsel for the employer has cited the cases Large v. Industrial
Commission. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) and Hodges v. Western
Piling & Sheeting Co. , 717 P.2d 713 (Utah 1986) for the proposition
that an award of permanent total disability benefits can only be
made where it is the industrial injury that causes the disability
(as opposed to a situation where an industrial injury occurs, but
some other factor or condition causes the disability). The ALJ
agrees that these two cases stand for the proposition that there
must be some causal link between the industrial injury and the
inability to work.
Both the employer and the Employers Reinsurance Fund have
argued that, currently, the applicant's most disabling condition is
his respiratory condition. Certainly, the 40% whole person rating
that the panel has assessed for that condition makes it clear that
the respiratory impairment is the most significant impairment that
the applicant has currently. However, in analyzing what is the
cause of the permanent total disability, the proper time focus is
not necessarily on the applicant's impairment status at the date of
hearing, but rather his impairment status at the date that he
discontinued working. Also, physical impairment alone is not the
only relevant criteria for determining what is causing an
individual to be unable to work.
In deterining whether an
industrial injury causes permanent total disability, the ALJ finds

ORDER
RE: GERALD HANSEN
PAGE 22

that it is appropriate to look at the time at which the applicant
discontinued working and then to determine what factor or factors
(including, but not limited to physical impairment) caused the
applicant to discontinue his/her working status.
Unfortunately, the absence of a separate statute of
limitations for permanent total disability claims allows for
significant time delays between the discontinuance of work and the
filing of a permanent total disability claim. These time delays in
turn cause the employer or carrier to be unable to perform any
meaningful discovery with respect to the cause of the
discontinuance of work. This certainly has occurred in this case.
Because the applicant discontinued working in 1977 and did not file
a permanent total disability claim until late 1991, information
regarding what was happening in 1977 for the applicant is very
sparse.
In addition, in this particular case, this lack of
information is compounded by the fact that the applicant recalls
very little about why he discontinued working and what efforts he
made, or could have made, to continue working in 1977. Finally,
clearly the statute anticipates that there will be some efforts at
rehabilitation once an injured employee determines he is unable to
return to his prior employment because of a job injury. However,
at this point, the defendants and the Division of Rehabilitation
cannot even attempt to offer rehabilitation, because the applicant
has developed a post-injury significant respiratory condition,
because he is now nearly retirement age, and because he has not
worked for the past 16 years.
Based on the foregoing concerns, the ALJ does not feel that
she has very accurate information on which to make a determination
as to what caused the applicant to discontinue working in 1977.
Nevertheless, the ALJ must look at what information there is and
make this determination. The applicant testified that his right
ankle and left knee injuries on May 21, 1976 prevented him from
doing the fairly heavy work that a glazier is required to perform.
Therefore, when he was unable to return as a glazier for Salt Lake
City Corporation in February 1977, and because he believed he could
no longer perform this occupation, the applicant proceeded to apply
for Social Security Disability benefits at that time. The ALJ
feels that it is logical that the knee and ankle impairments
prevented the heavy lifting, prolonged standing and stooping
required in glass installation work. However, there is certainly
some indication in the medical records that the applicant might
have been able to perform some other kind of work, nothwithstanding
the knee and ankle impairments, in 1977. Dr. Heyes suggested that
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the applicant could be a driver and the applicants initial
applications for Social Security Disability benefits were denied
because it was determined that he could still do light work.
Whereas rehabilitation currently is certainly untenable, in 1977
the applicant might have been able to return to some kind of work
had he sought or been offered some minimal new training.
Although logically it appears that return to work was not
completely foreclosed as of 1977, it would be speculative to find
that the applicant was susceptible to rehabilitation at that time.
No concrete evidence as been presented to support this conclusion.
Of course, as noted above, the long wait to file for permanent
total disability benefits is the primary cause of the lack of
concrete evidence on this point.
However, regardless of the
reason, there simply is insufficient evidence to show the applicant
was susceptible to rehabilitation in 1977. In 1978, after hearing
and testimony from a vocational expert, it was finally determined
that the applicant was disabled and entitled to Social Security
Disability benefits. It is interesting that the applicant was
initially denied continued disability benefits in 1983 when the
Social Security Administration
reassessed the applicant's
disability status. Once again, it was asserted that by the Social
Security Administration that the applicant was capable of light
work, but in the final analysis, the applicant again was determined
disabled and his benefits were reinstated so as to be continuous
from the date of the industrial injury on. Based on the minimal
evidence available (primarily the Social Security Disability
records), the ALJ would have to say that the preponderance of the
evidence shows that the applicant has been disabled since the date
of his industrial injury, May 21, 1976, to the present.
The only remaining question is whether the past 16 years of
disability have been caused by the May 21, 1976 industrial
accident. Once again, per the most relevant evidence available,
the Social Security Disability records reflect that the disability
benefits paid during this period were based on the applicants
orthopedic problems, including the right ankle and left knee
impairment (solely attrtibutable to the industrial injury per the
medical panel) as well as the low back (wholly non-industrial per
the panel). There is no way of knowing whether the non-industrial
back impairment alone would have been a sufficient basis for
awarding the Social Security benefits.
Although it is not
completely clear why the ankle and knee problems are always listed
first on the determination synopsis sheets, it may be that these
were found to be the more significant problems. The panel did rate
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the left knee and right ankle combined somewhat higher than the
back.
In addition, there is very little mention of the back
problems in the medical records and very little treatment for the
back during the past 16 years. More attention has been paid to the
left knee and right ankle, per the medical records. Therefore,
based on the scant information available, the ALJ finds that the
primary cause of the applicant's disability during the past 16
years has been the left knee and right ankle impairments sustained
in the May 21, 1976 industrial accident.
In conclusion, the ALJ finds that the applicant has been
disabled since the industrial injury on May 21, 1976 and that the
primary cause of this disability has been the industrial injuries
to the left knee and right ankle that were sustained on May 21,
1976. As the defendants have waived any referral to the Division
of Rehabilitation, the ALJ finds it is appropriate to make a final
award of permanent total disability benefits associated with the
May 21, 1976 industrial accident.
Benefits Due:
Prior Industrial Commission orders were entered on May 10,
1978, awarding the applicant $6,737.15 in temporary total
compensation and $5,158.23 in permanent impairment benefits, and on
December 31, 1982 awarding the applicant $1,785.24 in additional
temporary total compensation. The compensation rate used in both
of those orders was $148.77/week.
The ALJ presumes that the
amounts awarded in these orders, a total of $13,680.61, constitutes
the full payment that has been made by Salt Lake City Corporation
on the May 21, 1976 industrial accident.
Salt Lake City's,
liability for permanent total disability amounts to 312 weeks at
the maximum rate for permanent total disability benefits in May
1976 ($131.75), or a total of $41,106.00.
Of that amount
$27,425.39 remains to be paid ($41,106.00 - $13,680.61). That
amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest
and less the attorney fees to be adressed below. The Employers
Reinsurance Fund's liability for continuing benefits begins at the
conclusion of the initial 312 weeks or on January 30, 1983 (using
a start date February 5, 1977, the day following the last date of
work).
The Employers Reinsurance Fund is to pay benefits at
$131.75 per week, or at the minimum rate for permanent total
disability applicable if that is higher.
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Attorney fees are based on the benefits generated by the
attorney in the first 312 weeks per Commission rule R568-1-7, or
$27,425.39. Per the rule, the attorney fees are $3,000.00 (20% of
the first $15,000.00 generated) + $1,8631.81 (15% of the remainder
if it is less than $15,000.00, as it is in this case, $12,725.39 x
.15) or a total of $4,863.81.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay the applicant, Gerald Hansen,
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $131.75 per
week, for 312 weeks, or a total of $41,106.00, for the permanent
total disability resulting from the May 21, 1976 industrial
accident. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump
sum, less the $13,680.61 paid to date, plus interest at 8% per
annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded
below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay all medical expenses incurred as
the result of the May 21, 1976 industrial accident; said expenses
to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule
of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
applicant, the sum of $4,863.81, plus the percentage of interest
that is appropriate per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the
applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office of Virginius
Dabney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Employers
Reinsurance Fund shall prepare the necessary vouchers directing the
State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Employers Reinsurance Fund to
place the applicant, Gerald Hansen, on the Employers Reinsurance
Fund payroll as of Janaury 30, 1983, with payments to be made to
him at the rate of $131.75 per week, or at the minimum applicable
rate if that is higher. Said payments to the applicant should
continue for the remainder of his life or until further notice from
the Commission. Accrued payments are due and payable in a lump
sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
{?*&
day of ^>7]^^TA
„
,1993.
ATTEST:
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Patricia O. Ashby
Commission Secretar"
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attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the
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Gerald Hansen
1885 West Bowling Avenue
SLC, UT 84119
Virginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
350 South 400 East
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Attorney at Law
Salt Lake City Corporation
451 South State STreet, #505
SLC, UT 84111
Erie V. Boorman
Administrator
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
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Mr. Hansen alleges that on May 21, 197 6, he became totally and
permanently disabled because of an industrial injury suffered while
employed by Salt Lake City.
The ALJ awarded permanent total
disability benefits to Mr. Hansen. Salt Lake City then filed this
Motion For Review, challenging the ALJ's decision on a number of
different grounds.
Because the Commission concludes that Mr.
Hansen has failed to establish that his industrial accident in 1976
caused his now-claimed permanent total disability, the Commission
does not specifically address the other points raised by Salt Lake
City.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the
ALJ's decision.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under Utah's Workers Compensation Act, Mr. Hansen is entitled
to permanent total disability compensation only if he proves that
his 1976 injury caused his now-claimed permanent total disability.
See Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-67(1); also Large v. Industrial
Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988).
Other issues
regarding Mr. Hansen's claim are not reached unless he first
satisfies the threshold causation requirement. Zupon v. Industrial
Commission, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993).
In considering the issue of causation, the Commission notes
the Social Security Administration's determination that Mr. Hansen
was disabled from work after the 1976 injury.
However, the
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Commission does not know the underlying facts upon which the Social
Security Administration made its award, whether those facts are
supported by the evidence, or whether legal principles appropriate
to workers' compensation were applied by the Social Security
Administration in making its determination. For those reasons, the
Commission does not place a great deal of reliance on the Social
Security determination.1
The Commission also notes that Mr. Hansen received a 16%
permanent partial impairment rating as a result of the 1976
accident.
That impairment rating has never changed since his
industrial injury.
It is insufficient to prove that the 1976
accident caused Mr. Hansen to be permanently and totally disabled.
Finally, the Commission notes that Mr. Hansen did not actually
return to work after the 1976 accident. However, his failure to
return to work may be attributable to reasons other than his injury
and is therefore given little weight.
Other facts exist which indicate Mr. Hansen's 1976 accident
did not cause permanent total disability. Mr. Hansen's treating
physician released him to return to light duty work during 1977.
Mr. Hansen filed two claims for workers' compensation benefits
within a few years of the 1976 accident and thus was before the
Commission twice, but neither time did he claim to be permanently
and totally disabled. Shortly after his 1976 accident, Mr. Hansen
began suffering pulmonary problems then other assorted medical
problems, which have been appraised by a medical panel as much more
significant and debilitating than his industrial injury.
As noted above, Mr. Hansen claims that his 1976 industrial
injury caused permanent total disability as of 1976. The fact that
Mr. Hansen waited 14 years to raise his claim does not reduce his
burden of proof, or shift that burden of proof to his employer.
Had he raised his claim earlier, both parties could have provided
better evidence. Be that is it may, the Commission must make its
decision based on the evidence that is available now. In view of
the record before it, the Commission concludes that Mr. Hansen has
failed to prove his 1976 industrial injury caused his now-claimed
permanent total disability.

While the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 specifically refers to the "sequential
decision making process of the Social Security Administration", no such provision existed in Utah
law at the time of Mr. Hansen's injury.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Mr. Hansen's
claim for permanent total disability compensation.
It is so
ordered.
Dated this /?)

"day of May, 1994.

'Ctflleen S. Colton
Commissioner

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 2 0
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this
Order.
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class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of GERALD R. HANSEN v. SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION and EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND, Case Number 90-1056,
on the /3^day of May, 1994, to the following:
Virginius Dabney
DABNEY & DABNEY
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Ray L. Montgomery
Assistant City Attorney
451 South State, Suite 505
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Alan Hen
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah

ah\90-1056o

